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Abstract: In Poland, as well as in many other countries around the world, hospitals constitute
the cornerstone of health care provision. In 2020, hospitals stand at the frontline of the fight with
the coronavirus pandemic, and are facing huge pressures. The issue of supporting the financial
sustainability of the hospital sector has become especially important. The objectives of this study were
to: (1) Provide a retrospective evaluation of the reforms aimed at improving the financial sustainability
of hospitals in Poland, adopted and implemented within the last two decades (2000–2019), and
(2) identify the main drivers of hospitals’ financial standing. A longitudinal analysis (2003–2018) of
the stock of public hospital debt in Poland was also conducted. Methods applied included statistical
data analysis and literature review. Results indicate that diverse top-down approaches (debt-relief
programs with restructuration or corporatization elements as well as hospital network reform)
provided limited results in terms of the improvement of the individual hospitals’ financial standing.
The reasons for the reforms’ failures were mixed. Public hospitals operate under a unique and
complex system of regulations with diverse external stakeholders and/or determinants influencing
hospital revenues and cost generation. A more comprehensive and evidence-based approach is
needed in developing policies aimed at supporting hospitals’ financial sustainability in Poland.
Keywords: hospital; reform; financial sustainability; evaluation
1. Introduction
Hospitals constitute the cornerstone of health care systems around the world. Although,
for many years now, there have been international trends to shift towards ambulatory care provision,
promoting community care and implementing diverse inpatient care cost-containment procedures [1–3],
the position of hospitals is still strong. In 2017, among 31 OECD countries for which data are available,
the share of hospitals in total current health expenditures ranged from 28.3% in Germany to 53.2%
in Turkey, and was above 35% in 21 countries [4]. In 2017, hospitals employed more than half of the
total number of physicians and up to 80% of nurses among the majority of European Union countries
for which data are available (23 and 14, respectively) [5]. The basic function of every hospital is
providing medical services. Yet, hospitals carry out many other activities (e.g., teaching and research)
and constitute important social and economic stakeholders in their local environments [6].
The issue of hospitals’ financial sustainability constitutes a complex concept, in relation to both
the measurement techniques and the determining factors. Hospital financial performance can be
measured by diverse indicators related, e.g., to profitability, liquidity, assets, and debt, as well as
composite measures (combining multiple indicators) [7]. In terms of the factors influencing hospitals’
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financial performance, several literature reviews can be identified [8–11], but with the majority of
studies focusing on the United States (US) market. The authors propose diverse classifications of factors
influencing hospital performance, including among others: The ownership [8,10,11], governance [9],
and system affiliation [11].
The hospital sector in Poland holds many common characteristics with other Central and Eastern
European (CEE) countries [12]. As a post-communist country, Poland conducted major health system
reforms in the 1990s, including, i.g., introduction of public health insurance and independent payer
institutions, as well as decentralization of health care provision infrastructure ownership [13]. In 2016,
Poland spent 6.5% of its gross domestic product on health, which was below the European Union
average of 9.9% [5]. As in many others CEE countries, the hospital sector in Poland is characterized by
oversized infrastructure, the prevalence of publicly owned hospitals/beds, as well as public financing.
In 2018, beds in public hospitals constituted 87% of the total number of hospital beds in Poland.
The ownership structure of public hospitals is fragmented and divided between the three levels of local
government, ministries, and medical universities (Table S1 in the Supplementary Materials presents the
structure of the hospital sector in Poland in 2018). In comparison to other European countries, Poland
is characterized by overprovision of hospital care with simultaneous deficits in long-term care [5,14].
The issues of an instable financial situation and running overdue liabilities by public hospitals have
been immanent features of the Polish health system for more than two decades now [13,15–17]. This is
also similar to the situation in some of the others CEE countries, as the problem of public hospitals
running overdue liabilities exists, e.g., in Romania, Hungary, Croatia, Bulgaria, and Slovakia [12].
These countries have also conducted diverse reforms aimed (directly or indirectly) at managing
hospitals’ overdue liabilities and improving their financial standing. For example, in Hungary (2012),
Croatia (2013), and Slovakia (2016), hospitals’ ownership and/or management were centralized; in
Czechia (2005), public units were corporatized; while in Bulgaria (2018), unified standards for the
financial management of state hospitals were introduced [12].
In Poland, the question: “Who is responsible for hospital debts?” has never been answered,
with responsibility being passed between hospital management, the owners, the public health insurance
payer (National Health Fund—NHF), and the Ministry of Health. However, in practice, the hospital
owners (mostly local governments) were often forced to cover the hospitals’ financial deficits and/or
secure additional sources of funding [18,19]. In general, local governments are in a unique situation of
conflicting responsibilities. On one hand, they are the hospital owners, bearing the management and
financial burden, yet with no influence on the amount of funding received from the NHF. In addition,
any decision on hospital restructuration involving reducing beds and/or employment is politically
cumbersome due to pressures from local communities (e.g., when the hospital is the major employer in
the county/city) [16]. In 2019, the Constitutional Tribunal ruled it against the Polish Constitution (the
highest legal act) for the local government to cover hospitals’ financial deficits [20], opening the way to
future legislative changes.
As of writing this paper, the hospital sector in Poland is facing huge pressure due to the coronavirus
(COVID-19) pandemic [21]. The issue of supporting the financial sustainability of the hospital sector
has become especially important. A recently published study has indicated the generally difficult
financial situation of hospitals in Poland—in 2018, the majority of public hospitals generated a financial
loss, while 40% of hospitals had overdue liabilities [17]. The objectives of the current study are to:
(1) Provide a retrospective evaluation of the reforms aimed at improving the financial sustainability of
hospitals in Poland, adopted and implemented within the last two decades (2000–2019), and (2) identify
the main drivers of hospitals’ overdue liabilities. In order to provide background for these objectives, a
longitudinal analysis of the stock of public hospital debt in Poland between 2003 and 2018 was also
conducted. This paper constitutes a part of the World Bank long term project on the sustainability of
hospital care provision in Poland.
The importance of evaluating public policies, including health reforms, has been broadly discussed
in the literature [22–24]. Availability of the evidence regarding health reforms’ effects is crucial for
Sustainability 2020, 12, 4801 3 of 19
planning future interventions. In Europe, the potential for shared, cross-national policy learning in the
field of health reforms is high [12,25,26]. Thus, reform evaluations are valuable sources of information
for both national policy makers as well as an international audience. This paper adds to the existing
literature by providing a long-term review and evaluation of policy approaches aimed at improving
public hospitals’ financial standing in the example of one CEE country.
2. Materials and Methods
The methods used included quantitative analysis of the statistical data and a literature review.
The data from different sources were triangulated in order to obtain a more detailed and balanced
analysis of the research topic [27]. As diverse definitions can be used for the term ‘debt’, its meaning in
this paper is consistent with International Monetary Fund criteria [28]. The term ‘debt’ refers to all
liabilities, whilst arrears are overdue liabilities (thus included in overall debt).
The statistical data includes mainly those available in the public domain, aggregated data on:
The value of public hospital debt; the number of public hospital beds per ownership structure
and region; public payer (National Health Fund—NHF) budget per type of care. In the case
of the former, the data source was the statistical form Rb-Z, covering diverse financial liabilities
and being obligatorily submitted by all public institutions [29]. The aggregated data for public
health care providers are published quarterly by the Ministry of Health [30]. The data include all
public providers operating as independent health care units (samodzielny publiczny zakład opieki
zdrowotnej—SPZOZ), being the basic legal form of hospitals in Poland. It is a special legal form of
organization, with no bankruptcy capacity and dedicated solely for public health care providers [17].
In 2018, there were 471 hospitals—SPZOZs, with approximately 152 thousand beds, which constituted
83.7% and 73.1% of total public and all (both public and private) bed numbers, respectively (Table S1
in the Supplementary Materials).
The literature review covered: National strategic documents, legal regulations, technical and
audit reports, and articles in peer-reviewed journals related to hospital care organization and provision
in Poland, published and/or adopted between 2000 and 2020. An important source of data were
formal audit reports published by the Supreme Audit Office, which is the top independent state
audit institution responsible for fostering sound management and effectiveness in public service [31].
We have also reviewed official statements and/or recommendations issued by diverse stakeholders of
the national hospital sector, (i.g., the Polish Federation of Hospitals, the Union of University Clinics,
the Polish Counties Associations), as well as available conference proceedings, articles in professional
journals and relevant grey literature sources.
3. Results
The results presented below are divided into those related to the statistical data analysis (Section 3.1)
and national literature review (Sections 3.2 and 3.3)
3.1. The Stock of Hospital Debt and Arrears
Between 2003 and 2018, the value of overall debt increased by 32%, whilst arrears decreased by
74% (in real terms, 2003 prices). Although the dramatic increase in the total level of debt and arrears
observed between 2003 and 2006 was contained, the situation has remained at a stable, worrisome
level ever since (Figure 1). In 2018, the total debt of public providers (SPZOZs) was at the level of
13.1 billion PLN (0.6% of GDP), including 1.6 billion PLN of arrears. For hospitals, as for any other
types of enterprise, having liabilities (both long- and short-term) is a natural situation, standard from
the economical point of view. Yet, the problem arises when new liabilities are incurred in order to
settle overdue ones and the debt problem is simply postponed into the future (rolling-over debt).
Fragmented data show that this may be the case in some hospitals [19].
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Figure 1. Overall public hospitals debt and arrears as a % of GDP between 2003 and 2018.
3.1.1. As a Share of the Public Payer Budget
Over the years, a trend of decreasing the share of arrears in the overall debt value (from
62% in 2003–2004) can be observed (Table 1). This is the result of partially settling overdue
liabilities as well as the debt restructuration processes by means of increasing the share of long-term
liabilities—e.g., by taking loans and opening lines of credit in banks or other financial intermediaries
in order to settle arrears.
Table 1. The stock of public hospitals debts and arrears between 2003 and 2018.
Year
Nominal Values (Million PLN) Arrears as a %
of Overall
Debt
Overall Debt as a % of
National Health Fund
(NHF) Budget for Hospitals
Arrears as a %
of NHF Budget
for HospitalsOverall Debt Arrears
2003 7327.7 4543.7 62.01% N/A * N/A *
2004 9450.1 5872.3 62.14% 72.23% 44.88%
2005 10,273.6 4933.6 48.02% 71.05% 34.12%
2006 10,384.2 3723.8 35.86% 66.76% 23.94%
7 9563.3 2666.2 27.88% 54.58% 15.22%
2008 9979.7 2357.9 23.63% 40.05% 9.46%
2009 9627.6 2241.8 23.29% 36.95% 8.60%
2010 9963.1 2138.8 21.47% 36.81% 7.90%
2011 10,383.6 2316.5 22.31% 37.78% 8.43%
2012 10,661.4 2474.0 23.21% 35.72% 8.29%
13 9922.1 2015.5 20.31% 32.90% 6.68%
2014 10,345.8 1890.7 18.28% 33.27% 6.08%
2015 10,812.6 1754.3 16.22% 32.40% 5.26%
2016 11,249.5 1790.4 15.92% 31.98% 5.09%
2017 11,757.0 1464.6 12.46% 29.89% 3.72%
2018 13,064.1 1595.1 12.21% 30.58% 3.73%
* the National Health Fund was funded in 2004.
In the analyzed period, the public payer systematically increased the value of its budget for
hospitals (Figure 2). When adjusted for inflation, the NHF total budget increased between 2004 and
2018 twofold, while its share for hospitals increased 2.5 times (Table S2 in Supplementary Materials).
As a consequence, although the value of overall hospital debt remained on a relatively stable level,
its share in the NHF budget for hospitals systematically decreased (Table 1).
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Figure 2. The stock of public hospital debt and the public payer (NHF) budget between 2004 * and
2018 in real terms (2004 prices, Million PLN). * the National Health Fund was founded in 2004.
3.1.2. Per Region
In 2018, the region stock of debt was not commensurate with the size of its hospital sector.
Although the biggest share in the total debt value was attributable to regions with the highest number
of hospital beds (Mazowieckie and Śląskie), there were also regions with a low share of the number of
beds and a high value of arrears (Kujawsko-Pomorskie) as well as regions with a high share of the
number of beds and low arrears (Wielkopolskie) (Figure 3).
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Figure 3. Regions’ share of the total value of debt, arrears, and number of public hospital beds in
2018 (%).
Table S3 in the Supplementary Materials presents changes in the stock of public hospitals’ debts and
arrears between 2010 and 2018 per region. In general, significant variations can be observed between the
regions. The vast majority of regions (13 out of 16) increased their overall debt between 2010 and 2018,
yet at the same time, only one region (Kujawsko-Pomorskie) also increased its share of arrears. In 2018,
the share of arrears in the overall debt ranged from 2.7% in Lubuskie to 20.2% in Kujawsko-Pomorskie.
However, analysis of causes of regional differences in the hospitals’ debt burden should include hospital
level data. As of writing this paper, no data are available for 2018, but in 2016: In Kujawsko-Pomorskie
Voivodeship, 47% of the region’s overall debt and 23% of its arrears were generated by only one hospital
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(the most indebted hospital in Poland: The Regional Specialist Hospital in Grudziądz—Table S4 in the
Supplementary Materials presents its case study). Additionally, in 2016, in the Małopolskie region,
49% of overall debt and 54% of arrears were generated by two university hospitals. At the same time,
although Pomorskie Voivodeship was able to significantly reduce the overall value of debt and arrears
between 2010 and 2018 (Table S3 in the Supplementary Materials), it was also a voivodeship where
corporatization processes were quite popular and the debt of corporatized public hospitals is not
included in the aggregated data.
3.1.3. Per Owner
Hospitals owned by local government units represented the largest share of debt and arrears:
In 2018, their share of the total number of beds was at the level of 77%, of overall debt—72%, and of
arrears—62% (Table 2). The next position went to university hospitals which, although they represented
only 14% of beds, in 2018 accumulated 22% of overall debts and 32% of arrears. Hospitals owned by
medical universities were also characterized by the highest share of arrears in overall debt (almost 18%
in 2018) as well as the highest value of debt and arrears per one hospital bed (Table 2).





(Million PLN) Share (%)
Arrears

















governments 9425.9 996.8 72.18% 62.49% 10.57% 76.94% 80,672 8531
Medical
universities 2867.6 506.2 21.96% 31.73% 17.65% 13.80% 136,854 24,157
Ministries 765.9 92.1 5.86% 5.78% 12.03% 9.26% 54,471 6552
Total 13,059.4 1595.1 100.00% 100.00% 12.21% 100.00% 85,998 10,504
* Number of beds includes only public hospitals operating as SPZOZs (samodzielny publiczny zakład opieki
zdrowotnej); with more than 10 beds.
In terms of arrears—the majority of owners decreased the total value between 2010 and 2018.
Yet, for all types of owners there was an increase in the value of arrears between 2017 and 2018
(Figure 4). In general, when analyzing data per year, there was a significant decrease in the total value
of arrears between 2012 and 2013, caused mainly by a decrease in the number of local government
hospitals. This was partially caused by the corporatization processes of hospitals owned by local
governments conducted on the basis of the 2011 Law on Therapeutic Activities [32] (see the following
section). The debt of a corporatized hospital is not included in the aggregated data garnered and
published by the Ministry of Health (MoH) [30].
3.1.4. Structure of Arrears
In 2018, the overdue liabilities towards suppliers (drugs, materials, equipment, energy, etc.)
constituted almost 70% of the total arrears (Table 3). The main change, in comparison to 2010, is a
decrease in the share of social insurance liabilities (overdue hospital staff’s social insurance premiums).
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Table 3. Structure of arrears in 2010 * and 2018 (%).
Type of Arrears/Year 2010 2018
social insurance 12.39% 0.87%
taxes and other public liabilities 2.64% 0.36%
private liabilities 14.84% 11.87%
loans (from the owners and banks) 3.48% 0.45%
drug and material suppliers 40.47% 58.93%
equipment s ppliers 7.76% 6.97%
energy, gas, water suppliers 5.57% 2.79%
external services (renovations, transport services) 12.84% 17.77%
Total arrears 100.00% 100.00%
* No data on structure of arrears for previous years.
3.2. Evaluation of Central Government Efforts Aimed at Resolving the Hospital Debt Problem
Within the last two decades, the central government has made several direct and/or indirect
attempts to deal with the hospital debt problem. They have provided different requirements and
solutions for indebted hospitals (Table 4). The direct efforts included debt relief programs in combination
with hospital restructuration (2005) or corporatization (2009 and 2011). The total value of financial
support received by hospitals under these programs was approximately 5 billion PLN. It included
both written-off loans in the government owned bank and written-off public liabilities, as well as loans
received from the owners (local governments) and liabilities taken over by the owners. Implemented
in 2017—the hospital network reform, although not directly targeted at the hospitals’ debt problem,
included elements aimed at improving the relationship between the payer and hospital care providers
while ensuring continuity and stability of financing for the latter [33].
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Table 4. Central government programs aimed at resolving the hospital debt problem, implemented between 2000 and 2020.
No Adoption/Implementation Main Elements Implementation Process
Effect on Hospitals’ Financial Standing—Based on Case




• Loans from central and
local budgets and debt




561 hospitals applied for a loan, whilst 532 completed
the restructuration process.
• The overall value of loans given by the
government owned bank was 2.2 billion PLN,
59% of which was subsequently written off. In
addition, some of the tax (and other public)
liabilities were written off (approx. 750 million
PLN);
• hospitals undergoing the restructuration
processes also received financial support from
the owners [35]
Based on eight hospital CS (period 2005–2014):
• Receiving financial support was conditioned only by
launching the restructuration program and not
linked to its progress (hospitals failed to achieve the
targeted improvement, without any consequences);
• the final effect was highly dependent on the
individual hospital’s ability to manage the debt
problem (e.g., implementation of effective
cost-containment procedures, especially in relation
to staff costs);
• a crucial component was close cooperation between
the hospital management and the owner (local
government body) in planning and conducting the
restructuration process;
• in the majority of analyzed hospitals (five out of
eight), the support received was consumed without a
lasting improvement of financial standing [18].
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Table 4. Cont.
No Adoption/Implementation Main Elements Implementation Process
Effect on Hospitals’ Financial Standing—Based on Case




• Loans from central





Only 55% (754 million PLN) of the budgeted amount
was used:
• A total number of 62 local government units
participated: 54 SPZOZs were transformed into
commercial companies, and an additional 26
were liquidated [37];
• the total value of liabilities taken over by owners
of transformed hospitals—was at the level of 1.4
billion PLN [37].
Based on 20 hospital CS (period 2011–2014):
• Corporatization did not lead to significant changes in
the entities’ management processes (only 6 out of 20
hospitals had an active internal audit unit);
• corporatized hospitals did not implement effective
cost-containment procedures;
• the revenue structure of the transformed hospitals
did not change, with the vast majority of revenues
(>90%) coming from a contract with the NHF;
• in the group of hospitals whose debts were taken
over by a local government during the
transformation process—in 50% of cases, the
improvement in financial standing was short-term




• Loans from the central





The scale of the hospital corporatization process was
lower than expected:
• In the period of 2011–2013, 34 local government
units corporatized a total number of 45 SPZOZs;
• the majority of owners of hospitals with a deficit









• global budget for
complex care provision
[39].
A total number of 594 hospitals were included in the
network, the vast majority of which were public:
• The included hospitals were divided into seven
reference levels (three basic and four specialist);
• the included hospitals received guaranteed
access to public financing (for four years) and are
financed based on a global budget principle for
the complex care provided (in-patient as well as
ambulatory specialty visits and rehabilitation);
• there are financial incentives to shift towards
ambulatory care provision [33].
Based on 29 hospitals CS (period 2015–2018):
• The reform has not changed the structure of services
provided by hospitals, or led to
organizational changes;
• hospitals included in the network were characterized
by a low bed occupancy ratio (below 60%);
• although hospital revenues increased, the increase of
costs (mainly due to staff costs) was even
higher—between 2018 and 2017, the average values
increased by 13% and 17%, respectively;
• the reform has not improved hospitals financial
standing; the vast majority of audited units increased
the value of financial deficit and/or liabilities after
the reform implementation [40].
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3.2.1. The 2005 Debt Relief and Restructuration Program
The 2005 Law on Public Support and Restructuration of Public Health Care Units [34] introduced
a program of loans from the central budget and a debt forgiveness mechanism for SPZOZs which
provided a restructuration plan. The restructuration was to cover both operational and strategic
management changes aimed at improving the hospital’s financial standing. A total number of
561 hospitals applied for a loan from the government owned bank, whilst 532 of them completed
the restructuration process (Table 4). The direct result of the program was a significant decrease in
the value of aggregated hospital arrears, from 5.8 billion PLN in 2004 to 2.2 billion PLN in 2009 (see
the previous subsection). However, within the same period of time, the overall debt value slightly
increased. At the level of individual hospitals, the program achieved mixed results. In numerous cases,
the financial support was consumed without lasting improvement in financial standing [17,18].
3.2.2. The 2009 and 2011 Debt Relief and Corporatization Programs
Both the 2009 program of Supporting Local Government Units in Actions Stabilizing the Health
System [36] as well as the 2011 The Law on Therapeutic Activities [32] provided financial support for
the hospital owners—local governments, on the condition that they transform hospitals operating as a
SPZOZ into a commercial code company. The financial support was to cover the existing financial
deficit of the SPZOZ, thus allowing for the transformed hospital to begin operations as a debt-free
unit. The main assumption behind corporatization was that it creates strong incentives for the
hospital company owners to improve management, conduct restructuration programs, and ensure
financial liquidity.
The local government units’ participation in both programs was lower than expected. Under both
programs, a total number of 96 local governments corporatized 99 hospitals (Table 4). One of the
biggest inconsistencies of hospital sector governance in Poland was that within the last two decades,
the corporatized public hospitals were not formally tracked in public statistic. Thus, no data on
these hospitals’ debts and arrears are available. At the level of individual hospitals, the available,
fragmented data show that hospital corporatization provided mixed results in terms of improving
hospitals’ financial standing [38]. One of the main assumptions that was not realized in practice—was
the predicted increase in commercial patient revenues. In general, in Poland the corporatized hospitals
are no longer subject to the legal ban on commercial patients (as is the case for SPZOZs). Yet, the audit
conducted on a group of 20 hospitals showed that after corporatization, the revenue structure had not
changed (more than 90% of revenues came from the contract with the public payer) [38]. Additionally,
corporatization did not lead to significant changes in the entities’ management processes. Similarly,
as with the 2005 debt relief and restructuration program, in numerous cases the financial support led
to short-term improvement in financial standing with increasing deficits in the following years.
3.2.3. The 2017 Hospital Network Reform
The hospital network reform was introduced on an ad hoc basis, without proper preparation
and a vocatio legis period [33,41]. It introduced a system of basic hospital service provision with a
4-year guarantee of financing. The majority of public hospitals were included [33]. Analyses based
on fragmented data indicate that the reforms have not changed the structure of services provided by
hospitals, or improved their financial standing [40]. In general, the network inclusion criteria were
based on the existing infrastructure, rather than population health needs [33,40]. The period of the
reform implementation overlapped with introduction of significant regulatory wage increases for
medical workers, as well as an increase of the industry minimal wage [42]. As a consequence, although
the nominal value of the revenues generated by the hospitals included in the network increased after
the reform implementation, the increase of the costs was even higher. For example, in the case of county
hospitals, the vast majority of which were included at the basic, level 1 of the network, the period
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after reform implementation was characterized by significant deterioration of hospitals’ financial
situation [17,43,44].
3.3. Factors Driving New Arrears
The direct reason of the debt accumulation is continuing deficit—the excess of the hospital
expenditures over revenues in the fiscal year. Hospitals operate in a highly regulated environment
and there are diverse factors that can influence the value of their revenues and expenditures. Table 5
presents the matrix of influencers on public hospital revenues and expenditures in Poland. The main
stakeholders are: The Ministry of Health, the payer (National Health Fund), the owners of hospitals
(local governments, medical universities, and ministries), and hospitals themselves (their management).
In general, the first three stakeholders provide determinants that can be classified as external to the
hospital management. The presented factors do not constitute a complete list, but rather, a general
overview and some examples of possible determinants of the hospitals revenues and expenditures.
Table 5. Matrix of influencers on public hospital revenues and expenditures in Poland.
Actors/Influencers Revenues Expenditures
Ministry of Health
• benefit package (inclusion/exclusion
of services)
• prices of services (role of the
Tariff Agency)
• legal regulations on revenue
differentiation (e.g., the ban on
commercial services for SPZOZs)
• division of the EU investment funds
• influencing demand through





• regulations on salaries
(regulatory wage increases)
• medicine prices (negotiations
carried out by the Ministry
of Health)
• regulations on quality in
health care
National Health Fund
• decision on inclusion of hospitals in
the network
• contracting procedure
• rules on paying for overprovision
• the budget division between NHF
regional branches
• control procedures (fines)
Hospital owners
• financing investments
• paying debts/losses (formal
acceptance of financial statements)
• major restructuration decisions
(consent from the owner as
a prerequisite)
• joint procurement initiatives (in
relation to both medical and
non-medical supplies)
Hospital management
• revenues other than NHF (e.g., from
non-medical services or
from investment)
• coding within the diagnostic related
group system
• management of staff costs
• other cost-containment activities
(e.g., outsourcing, debt
restructuration programs)
Among the diverse factors influencing hospital revenues—the pricing of services and NHF
activities related to setting the final payment value (for both services included and excluded from the
network) are the major ones. In terms of the expenditures side—staff costs are the most important
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factor. Finally, both elements of the financial outcome equation (revenues and costs) are influenced by
management techniques at the level of individual hospitals.
The subject of hospital services price valuation has for many years aroused numerous controversies.
Some types of services were believed to be valued below the actual costs of provision, whilst others
generated profits. The main stakeholders were largely cognizant of the problem. Thus, in 2015,
the Tariff Agency was launched (as a part of the Agency of Health Technology Assessment). Its main
objective was to improve the cost base for hospital service reimbursement mechanisms [45]. The agency
developed guidelines for a standardized cost reporting scheme for hospitals (applied by hospitals on
a voluntary basis) and systematically carries out assessment of the real costs of pre-defined hospital
services. The agency issues recommendations on the DRGs cost base adjustment, which should be
applied by the payer, beginning in the new reporting period. However, the biggest challenge seems
to be its retrospective character, which results in price valuation ‘lagging behind’ the current cost
influencers (e.g., significant staff costs increases) [46].
In Poland, the public payer (NHF) holds a monopsony position in financing health services [13].
The value of the payment received from the NHF is the main determinant of hospital revenues. This is
influenced not only by the scope of services provided, but also their price valuation, as well as diverse
details of the payment mechanism. The indirect objective of the hospital network reform (2017) was to
eliminate the issue of hospitals providing services above the contracted limit. Under the new system,
the value of the hospital budget for future periods is calculated based on the number and value of
services provided in the previous period. Yet, the mathematical formula for the budget calculation
includes negative financial incentives for exceeding its granted value—the higher the overspending,
the lower the increase of the future budget (optimal budget realization is between 98% and 102% of its
total value) [33]. In practice, the NHF can pay for the services provided above the hospital budget only
when it has adequate reserve funds (e.g., when other hospitals from the region do not exhaust their
budgets, creating savings for the payer).
In terms of the expenditure side—personnel costs constitute the major contributor. In 2018,
the average share of staff costs in total hospitals costs ranged from 47.1% in university hospitals to more
than 64.5% in the case of hospitals owned by counties and cities (general, local hospitals). For all types
of hospital owners, the share of staff costs in total costs increased between 2013 and 2018 [47]. Staff costs
are influenced by both regulatory salary increases as well as formal professional standards (regulations
on personnel qualifications and work organization). Due to professional standards, hospitals managers
need to hire a pre-defined amount of medical staff with pre-defined qualifications in order to be able
to provide services within the public system. While minimum standards can help ensure patient
safety, in the context of the general problem of high doctor and nurse deficits in Poland, they also
put hospital managers under strong pressure. Case studies of individual hospitals show that due to
the doctor deficits, hospitals were forced to cease provision of specific services [48]. In general, there
is high competition in employing doctors, and hospital managers need to use financial incentives
to attract physicians [42]. In terms of salary levels, the Polish health system has a long tradition of
medical workers striking over wage increases. The government’s reaction to strikes has taken the
form of regulations on wage increases related to all professions or settlements with a particular staff
category [42]. The most recent regulation related to medical workers salaries was adopted in 2017 and
introduced graduated minimum wages (by staff category), with annual increases until reaching the
targeted level in 2021 [49]. In general, the average level of medical workers’ salaries in comparison
to other sectors has significantly increased during the last two decades: From 1.3 to 2.2 for doctors,
and from 0.7 to 1.2 for nurses, between 2002 and 2018 (Table S5 in the Supplementary Materials).
However, this still does not satisfy the demands, and it remains low in comparison to other high-income
countries [42].
Finally, at the level of individual hospitals, the problem of poor financial standing might relate
to ineffective management. Several case studies of highly indebted hospitals indicated the existence
of numerous problems related to ineffective management as well as lack of proper monitoring and
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involvement by the hospital owner [18,50–52]. Table S4 in the Supplementary Materials presents the
case study of the Regional Specialist Hospital in Grudziądz—the most indebted hospital in Poland
in 2018.
4. Discussion
The results indicate that accumulation of debts by public hospitals has been an immanent feature
of the Polish health system for more than two decades now. The significant increase in the total level of
debt and arrears observed at the beginning of the century was contained. Yet, the stock of hospital debt
remains on a relatively stable level, despite a significant increase in hospital financing by the public
payer (the NHF budget for hospitals increased 2.5 times between 2004 and 2018) (Figure 2).
Evaluation of the central government efforts aimed at resolving the hospital debt problem indicates
limited results in terms of improving individual hospitals’ financial standing. Case studies of individual
hospitals showed that under both the debt relief programs connected with restructuration and the
corporatization processes, the final effect was highly dependent on the individual hospital’s ability
to manage its debt. In the long term, in the case of both approaches, numerous hospitals consumed
the financial support without lasting improvement in the financial standing (Table 4). Additionally,
implementation of the 2017 hospital network reform did not result in improving hospitals’ financial
standing. Analysis of factors driving new arrears indicated the existence of a wide variety of external
determinants that can influence the value of revenues and costs generated by hospitals. In the case of
the revenues side, the services’ price valuation and the public payer activities related to setting the
final payment value are the major ones. In terms of the expenditures side, the staff cost influencers
(regulatory salary increases and professional standards) constitute the most important factors.
Within the last decade, many European countries have conducted hospital sector reforms as
a response to the 2007/2008 global financial crisis [53,54]. According to the analysis by Mladovsky
et al. (2015), between 2008 and 2013, at least 19 European countries implemented reforms aimed
at reducing hospital budgets, fees, or tariffs, as well as diverse restructuration processes, including
hospitals closures and mergers [54]. Poland was not affected by recession after the 2007–2008 financial
crisis, and within the last two decades, has experienced strong economic growth without any obvious
macroeconomic imbalances [55]. This may have contributed to a less strict approach to reforming
the hospital sector and containing its costs than those applied in other countries. As other European
countries implemented diverse hospital spending limits and/or staff cost caps [12,54], our results
showed that in Poland the NHF budget for hospitals systematically increased as well as the medical
staff salaries (Tables S2 and S5 in the Supplementary Materials). Additionally, no direct measures were
applied in Poland in order to limit the oversized infrastructure. Although some promising programs
have been developed to improve the hospital care capacity planning at both central and regional levels
(health needs maps, capital investments assessment, the hospital network) [56], no practical progress
have been made [21].
The issue of the general difficulty and numerous challenges in conducting hospital sector reforms
has been broadly discussed in the international literature [57–61]. In general, hospitals are organizations
characterized by a high resistance to change [59,60]. Public hospitals are especially problematic in
implementing changes due to determinants related to structural dysfunctionalities and bureaucracy
issues [59]. In Poland, as well as other countries, public hospitals operate under a unique and
extremely complex system of regulations. There are several stakeholders directly influencing hospital
management, with different and often competing interests. For hospital sector governance reforms to
be effective, strategic decisions at the macro level must be complemented by appropriate management
at the level of individual hospitals. The first area is politically influenced and value based, while
the other has a rather technical character with performance indicators that can be measured both
clinically and financially [58]. Our results have shown that in Poland, the top-down approaches aimed
at improving public hospitals’ financial standing were not effective. Reforms implemented by the
central government were often not accompanied by appropriate management changes at the level of
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individual hospitals. The reasons for the reforms’ failures were mixed and included, e.g., ineffective
management at the level of individual hospitals; lack of cooperation between the hospital owners
and the management; inability of the hospitals to break-even due to cost increases driven mainly by
external factors (regulatory salary increases).
Evidence from other countries shows that health system reforms often face implementation
barriers and a lack of adequate political commitment needed to overcome vested interests and apply
a longer-term approach [54]. A recently published comparative analysis on hospital sector reform
in 11 CEE countries, implemented between 2008 and2019, indicated the existence of three major
challenges, common throughout the analyzed countries, in conducting hospital reforms: The lack
of a comprehensive approach; unclear outcomes; and political influence [12]. These also apply to
the policy approaches analyzed in our paper. All central government reforms aimed at improving
hospitals’ financial standing conducted within the last two decades in Poland lacked a comprehensive
approach and provided mixed outcomes. The issue of political influence was especially relevant
to the process of hospital corporatization. Between 2008 and 2015, the Ministry of Health strongly
supported corporatization and provided financial incentives for local government to conduct the
process, while after the parliamentary elections in 2015, the party that took over declared itself against it.
Additionally, in the case of corporatization the issue of ‘political influence’ has another dimension—the
trade-off between central and local policy responsibilities. After corporatization, hospitals were no
longer subject to Ministry of Health reporting requirements regarding their level of debt, which may
be indirectly interpreted as shifting the whole responsibility to the owners (local governments).
In general, the fact that in Poland the majority of hospitals are owned by independent local
governments and that these owners have decided to conduct corporatization processes (as a means
to increase the hospital managerial autonomy, among other reasons) is in line with trends in other
European countries with decentralized hospital governance [62]. Such decentralization is seen as a
means to improve hospital responsiveness to community needs and increase flexibility. Yet, this also
means acknowledging the loss of the potential efficiency gains from centralization and the need to
balance system level objectives and the ‘narrower focus’ decision making in a locally run system [62].
In Europe, a variety of approaches have been applied, aimed directly or indirectly at enhancing hospital
cost-containment. Studies show numerous similarities between different countries in relation to the
reforms’ content and objectives [2,12,54]. Yet, at the same time, the evidence on the reform results is
limited. There is a lack of comprehensive reform evaluation allowing for shared learning [2,12].
To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study providing an overview of the policy approaches
aimed at improving hospitals’ financial standing in Poland. Our study includes longitudinal
analyses and presents the complexity of the hospitals’ financial standing determinants—from different
perspectives and policy levels. There are however limitations to be noted. The major one is related to
the data sources. In general, in Poland, the lack of good quality and comprehensive data on hospital
sector operation constitutes a huge challenge [17,63,64]. As mentioned in the methods, the aggregated
data on the stock of public hospital debt covers only hospitals operating as SPZOZs. As a consequence,
it does not cover corporatized hospitals and research institutes, which in 2018 represented 14.3% and
3.0% of the total number of hospital beds, respectively (Table S1 in the Supplementary Materials).
In addition, the evaluation of the reforms’ impact on the hospital’s financial standing was based on
fragmented data—case studies of groups of hospitals, as presented in the Supreme Audit Office reports.
In order to secure the validity of the findings, the data from these reports were triangulated with the
available literature. Due to lack of data, the authors were also unable to provide a more comprehensive
evaluation, e.g., with the application of some of the existing theoretical frameworks for health reform
assessment [24,57,65]. We have applied a narrow perspective—focusing solely on the objective of
improving hospitals’ financial standing (reducing overdue liabilities), while the important aspects of
reforms’ potential impact on quality of care and/or accessibility were not analyzed.
This study provides an important implication for both the researchers and policy-makers. In the
case of the former, there is a need to plan and conduct a primary data research on hospital financial
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performance which should support the process of developing evidence informed policy interventions.
There seem to be a gap in literature on financial performance of hospitals (and its determinants) in
European countries, as majority of available evidence is focused on the US market. For example,
in Poland good research data are needed on the incentives to change at the level of individual hospitals.
The national policy-makers, on the other hand, need to: (1) Develop regulations which enable building
a comprehensive hospital sector data warehouse; (2) include the policies impact evaluation (both
ex-ante and post-hoc) as an obligatory element of the reform planning and implementation process.
Our results showed that during the last two decades, the process of governance of public hospitals
in Poland was characterized by numerous inconsistencies. Top down approaches were ineffective
in securing the financial sustainability of the hospital sector. There is no single and straightforward
solution to the problem of hospitals’ poor financial standing, and diverse hospitals might need different
set of solutions. While planning future reforms a comprehensive and multilevel approach must be
applied. Diverse stakeholders at the micro and mezzo levels need appropriate sets of incentives and
practical tools in order to meet the system level objectives of accessible, cost-effective hospital care of
appropriate quality. The current (2020) crisis related to the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic put
hospitals in the center of policy-makers interest. It is a source of huge pressures for hospitals, but can
also be seen as a window of opportunity for conducting positive hospital sector reforms [66].
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Dept of the Regional Hospital in Grudziądz; Supreme Audit Office: Warszawa, Poland, 2015. Available
online: https://www.nik.gov.pl/aktualnosci/nik-o-zadluzeniu-szpitala-w-grudziadzu.html (accessed on
20 April 2020). (In Polish)
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